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Who gets what in bargaining between states and international organizations? Although distributional
conflict is unavoidable in international cooperation, previous research provides few empirical insights
into the determinants of bargaining outcomes. We test a simple bargaining model of cooperation be-
tween states and international organizations. We expect that non-egalitarian international organizations,
such as the World Bank, secure more gains from bargaining with economically weak than with econom-
ically powerful states. For egalitarian international organizations, such as most United Nations agencies,
the state’s economic power should be less important. We test these hypotheses against a novel data set
on funding shares for 2,257 projects implemented under the auspices of the Global Environment Facil-
ity, 1991-2011. The data allow us to directly measure bargaining outcomes. The results highlight the
importance of accounting for the interactive effects of international organization and state characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Who gets what when states and international organizations (IOs) bargain? Many IOs are both chastised
and praised for playing hardball with states. For example, both the World Bank (WB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) frequently attach stringent conditions to concessional loans (Kilby, 2009; Stone,
2011). Though politically controversial, these conditions benefit the major powers that dominate decision
making in these organizations.
While international relations scholars have examined IO-state bargaining (Nielson and Tierney, 2003;
Kilby, 2009; Stone, 2011), their theories mostly do not distinguish between different IO types. For example,
previous theories do not theorize about the different effects of state power on bargaining outcomes in nego-
tiations with the IMF and different United Nations (UN) agencies. Yet, it seems plausible that the IMF and
other organizations governed by the “one dollar, one vote” principle would respond to increased state power
differently than UN agencies and other organizations governed by the “one country, one vote” principle.
This lack of attention to IO types in bargaining raises important questions. Can one fruitfully theorize
about IO-state bargaining without account for the IO’s type? Given how many IOs frequently bargain
with states on the distribution of gains from cooperation, understanding the effects of IO type could also
solve important empirical puzzles. For example, it could explain why different multilateral development
organizations, such as UN agencies and the WB, are more or less able than others to pursue their political-
economic goals through project implementation in recipient countries.
This article offers an empirical test of hypotheses derived from a stylized formal model of IO-state bar-
gaining. While the general argument applies to a wide range of bargaining settings, from accession negoti-
ations to budget contributions, we focus on burden sharing in project lending for concreteness. Specifically,
we examine how much the IO contributes relative to the state’s contribution. For example, the model could
be applied to explain how much a development bank must contribute to an infrastructure project to “seal the
deal” with a recipient developing country.
The simple and stylized model generates hypotheses on the interactive effects of IO type and the state’s
economic importance. Some organizations, such as UN agencies, hold “egalitarian” preferences. For such
organizations, we do not expect the state’s economic importance to play a major role. Given the egalitarian
bias, the IO’s bargaining power does not decrease as the state’s economic importance grows. Other inter-
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national organizations, such as the WB, are “non-egalitarian.” Their ability to secure concessions depends
critically on the state’s economic importance. Given the importance of power politics in these organizations’
decision making, they are willing and able to extract large concessions from economically weak states.
To test the two hypotheses, we leverage a new data set on bargaining between the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) and 157 recipients for 2,257 environmental projects implemented in the years 1991-2011.
This large data set on projects allows us to account for variation in both recipient and project characteristics.
The GEF data set also provides us with a direct measure of the bargaining power. For every project that
the GEF has funded, we have data on the GEF’s funding share. Falling on the [0, 1] interval, this variable
allows us to directly measure the bargaining outcome. Moreover, the GEF delegates the implementation of
each project to an “implementing agency”, such as the WB. While all GEF projects are grants, not loans,
administered under GEF rules, the implementing agencies are responsible for negotiating and implementing
the contracts. Thus, we can explore variation in bargaining outcomes across different IO types while holding
constant several contextual factors.
The results largely support the hypotheses. Most importantly, when a GEF project is implemented by the
WB, a canonical non-egalitarian organization, the recipient’s economic importance is a powerful predictor of
the GEF’s funding share. But when the GEF delegates project implementation to more egalitarian agencies,
small recipients do no worse than large recipients.
Our analysis sheds new light on the interactive effects of IO and state characteristics in strategic inter-
action. Previous research has recognized that both the characteristics of international organizations (Barnett
and Finnemore, 2004) and states (Stone, 2008; Kilby, 2009) influence their strategic behavior, but the in-
teractive effects of these characteristics have not been theorized. Our analysis shows that this omission can
lead to misleading conclusions. For example, we found that only non-egalitarian organizations are sensitive
to the state’s economic importance, and so variation in states’ economic strength will have contingent effects
on their abilities to bargain with different international organizations.
The empirical findings have some troubling normative implications. Compared to the UN agencies, the
WB is a much more important source of development assistance. If GEF projects implemented by the WB
have a clear bias in favor of wealthy, powerful recipients, then the least developed countries benefit from
these resources the least. Might prevails over right, and the full potential of international environmental
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assistance for sustainable development remains unrealized.
2 International Organizations and Bargaining
IO-state bargaining is common in international politics. For example, an IO could offer accession to a
potential candidate state. Given this offer, the IO and the state would bargain over the terms of accession.
The state could offer policy concessions while the IO could offer to allow early accession or changes to
institutional design. Bargaining determines how the gains from accession are distributed.
When allocating resources, IOs engage in bargaining with states over the terms of a contract. Multilateral
development banks such as the Asian Development Bank can provide funds to their member states, but the
available funds are scarce. Most member states prefer to maximize their share of the funds received, while
the bank prefers policy concessions at the lowest possible price (Addison, McGillivray, and Odedokun,
2004; Nielson and Tierney, 2003). This distributional conflict prompts bargaining.
Previous studies offer several insights into the determinants of bargaining power. IO voting rules are
a natural point of departure. When an IO bargains with a state, the state may gain bargaining leverage
through voting rules in at least two ways. First, as a formal member of the IO, the state would be able to
vote on the IO’s policy. Second, even if the bargaining state is not a member, voting rules could favor or
discriminate against members who are allied with the state in focus. The state could encourage its allies to
support policies that increase the state’s bargaining power.
The evidence for this intuitive notion remains scarce. Nielson and Tierney (2003) find that voting power
influences “agency slippage” for environmental lending in the WB. States who are pivotal in coalition for-
mation among the membership exert considerable influence on the WB’s environmental lending decisions.
Similarly, Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney (2009) show that member states’ preferences and voting power influ-
ence the nature of the social projects that different development banks implement. However, neither article
specifically focuses on the distribution of gains from bargaining.
The preferences of major powers also matter for bargaining. If key members of the IO have a preference
for a given outcome, then this outcome can be expected to emerge from IO-state bargaining. For example,
suppose the WB bargains with a state on project implementation. Intuitively, this state should do better if it
is an important ally of the United States, the largest shareholder of the WB.
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A burgeoning empirical literature has analyzed this issue. Stone (2004) shows that the IMF imposes
less severe punishments for violating conditionality on African countries that are allies of the United States
and France. More recently, Stone (2011) shows that this is generally how the IMF treats different mem-
ber states in need: if a member state is important for the U.S., the member state obtains loans with less
stringent conditions attached. Fleck and Kilby (2006) and Kilby (2009) find that the United States influ-
ences resource allocation in the WB. However, none of these studies focus on situations characterized by
purely distributive bargaining. Some recipient governments may prefer IMF conditionality to tie their hands
(Drazen, 2002; Vreeland, 2003), while the size of an IMF or WB loan may reflect recipient needs. Our
analysis complements these studies by focusing on a clear instance of zero-sum bargaining.
Recipients’ characteristics also matter. Some recipients are strategically important, either because they
are highly relevant for the issue at hand or otherwise influential in world politics. For example, one may
conjecture that large economies capable of influencing global economic growth should perform better than
small economies when bargaining with economic IOs (Stone, 2002). Similarly, countries with large rain-
forests should perform better in bargaining with environmental IOs focusing on biodiversity (Hicks et al.,
2008).
For this hypothesis, some indirect evidence exists. Hicks et al. (2008) show that countries that are
geographically close to donors obtain more aid focused on local environmental problems, suggesting that
environmental significance could enhance a recipient’s ability to issue demands concerning the types of
environmental projects that donors fund. Similarly, Stone (2002) shows that the IMF has been unable
to credibly threaten large Eastern European countries, especially Russia, with punishment for violating
IMF conditions. However, both studies provide only indirect evidence for the determinants of bargaining
outcomes.
In the analysis, we focus on distributional outcomes conditional on IO design. In doing so, we recognize
that institutional design is itself endogenous to state preferences (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Koremenos,
Lipson, and Snidal, 2001; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996) and a subject of intense bargaining (Krasner,
1982; Gruber, 2000). In a full model of the causal chain, state preferences and contextual factors determine
IO design, and the organization itself plays the role of an “intervening variable” in the determination of
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outcomes (Krasner, 1982). Our focus is on the second component of the chain.1
3 Formal Model
Our simple and stylized bargaining model generates intuitive, empirically testable hypotheses about the
determinants of bargaining power in IO-state cooperation. While the model is not complex, we prefer
formalizing the theory to ensure deductive validity and derive an internally consistent set of hypotheses. For
concreteness, we assume the state is a “recipient country” negotiating over project funding. However, the
bargaining model is intended to apply to a wider variety of strategic settings. Among other things, the IO
could bargain over control of WB project implementation, IMF conditionality, or EU accession.
Both the IO and the recipient country value the project, but project implementation is costly. Our analysis
concentrates on the distribution of project costs. When the IO is in a strong bargaining position, it needs
not contribute much. When the IO is in a weak bargaining position, it contributes large sums to project
implementation. From the IO’s perspective, this is rational. For example, consider environmental protection.
The lower the IO’s contribution per project, the more and larger projects the IO can implement. Overall, the
IO achieves better environmental outcomes by minimizing contributions per project.
We focus on two theoretically informed independent variables. First, we measure IO type. We distin-
guish between “egalitarian” and “non-egalitarian” IOs. Egalitarian IOs are biased towards the preferences
of poor and small countries. While these IOs bargain with countries over burden sharing, they do not be-
have differently vis-à-vis countries of different size: the determinants of bargaining power are orthogonal to
structural power. For example, with the exception of the Security Council, decisions within United Nations
(UN) agencies follow the “one country, one vote” principle. Given this institutional rule, interactions in
egalitarian IOs mitigate power asymmetries between countries such as Zambia and the Russian Federation.
Conversely, non-egalitarian IOs are willing to exploit poor and small countries’ vulnerability to external
pressure for bargaining advantage. In general, they subscribe to the “one dollar, one vote” logic (Young and
Boehmer-Christiansen, 1997, 196). Consequently, they should achieve better outcomes in bargaining with
economically weak countries than in bargaining with economically powerful countries. For example, both
1Empirically, this restriction is appropriate because the implementing agencies we analyze were designed decades ago without
focusing on environmental concerns. For distributional conflict in the design of the GEF, see Streck (2001).
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the IMF and the WB are more sensitive to major shareholders’ concerns than to other countries’ concerns
(Woods, 2006; Stone, 2011).
The distinction between non-egalitarian and egalitarian organizations focuses on bargaining, and we
do not attempt to theorize about the relevant channels of influence. Some scholars emphasize “informal
governance” as major powers circumscribe formal rules (Stone, 2011), while others focus on voting rules
(Nielson and Tierney, 2003). We also do not attempt to evaluate the relative power of the United States and
other major donors in GEF negotiations.
Our second independent variable is the expected availability of private capital for project implementa-
tion. If private capital is in abundant supply, we assume the recipient country obtains ancillary benefits from
project implementation. Infusion of private capital creates employment opportunities, adds value to the na-
tional economy, and often allows technology transfer (Glass and Saggi, 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Blalock and
Gertler, 2008). Therefore, the recipient’s valuation of the project increases: in addition to the direct benefits
of IO funding, the recipient obtains private capital that generates economic rents for domestic constituencies.
In turn, the IO does not need to contribute as much to seal the deal with the recipient.
3.1 Bargaining Game
Formally, we consider a Nash (1950) bargaining model between two players. While the Nash model was
initially designed for cooperative game theory, Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) show that it
approximates the solution of Rubinstein’s (1982) non-cooperative bargaining game with repeated offers,
provided that the time between offers is small ehough. Therefore, we can apply the Nash approach to
analyze the outcome of non-cooperative IO-state bargaining under anarchy.
Suppose an international organization, IO, and a recipient country, R, bargain over the implementa-
tion of a project. Their strictly positive valuations of project implementation are denoted by VIO and VR,
respectively. The cost of the project is denoted by C and assumed to be strictly positive. Project implemen-
tation is collectively profitable whenever VIO + VR ≥ C. Otherwise project implementation is too costly.
Our analysis focuses on the case of collective profitability, because unprofitable projects do not induce any
distribution of gains.
The Nash (1950) approach to bargaining is based on the simplest possible game: the IO and the recipient
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simultaneously propose their funding shares, tIO and tR. For successful project implementation, the sum of
these contributions must cover the project cost. Unless tIO + tR = C, the project fails and disagreement
payoffs are allocated. Without loss of generality, we normalize both disagreement payoffs to zero.
While we assume the IO prefers to minimize its funding share, this does not mean the IO does not face
pressure to implement projects. Even if the IO faces bureaucratic pressures to provide money (Tendler,
1975), it prefers to minimize its funding share for any given project. Formally, the IO could be punished for
failing to implement the project, so that the pressure to implement projects would be captured in the outside
options.
3.2 International Organization’s Payoff
Upon successful project implementation, the IO’s payoff UIO is the difference between its project valuation,
VIO, and its funding share, tIO. The IO’s project valuation can be thought of representing the donors’ collec-
tive valuation of the project’s benefits. For example, in environmental assistance these benefits might depend
on the donors’ vulnerability to negative environmental externalities (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994) and the
political clout of environmental interest groups (Dai, 2005). In part, the collective valuation could also re-
flect the IO staff’s preferences (Nielson and Tierney, 2003). Since this funding share can be expressed as
overall project costs net of the recipient country’s financial participation, successful project implementation
leaves the IO with a payoff of
UIO = VIO − (C − tR) = VIO − tIO. (1)
The IO’s payoff increases with its own valuation of the project, VIO and with the recipient’s funding share,
tR. The payoff decreases with the total project cost, C. Notably, this expression also highlights the zero-
sum dimension of the bargaining problem: the IO prefers higher contributions by the recipient country. In
equilibrium, tIO decreases as the IO’s bargaining power increases.
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3.3 Recipient’s Payoff
Upon successful project implementation, the recipient country’s payoff is the difference between project
valuation, VR, and the funding contribution, tR. We conceptualize the recipient’s project valuation VR as
the sum of direct project benefits, B, and indirect ancillary benefits P from project implementation. In view
of our empirical application, the indirect project benefits P can be seen as the availability of supplementary
private capital that the project leverages. For example, in the case of the GEF, private cofinancing is consid-
ered an important “institutional and operational efficiency [criterion] of the GEF” (Clémençon, 2006, 51)
because it reduces the need for public funding.
The ancillary benefits P increase with the project’s ability to leverage additional private capital. In
project implementation, core funding is assumed to be public. It is provided by the IO and the state. How-
ever, public funding for project implementation creates lucrative business opportunities. If the project gen-
erates profitable opportunities for businesses, they invest in it, as explained above. For example, a trans-
portation infrastructure project in Africa could leverage private capital for improved port facilities or even
give rise to new export businesses. In this case, the value of P would be high. The recipient benefits from
reduced unemployment, economic growth, new technology, and so on. We assume private capital is supplied
by markets, so that investors do not participate directly in bargaining. For example, this assumption is met
in the case of the GEF because investors do not participate in negotiations on project implementation.
Given successful project implementation, we require that tIO and tR cover the full project cost C.
Therefore, the recipient’s payoff is
UR = VR − tR = B + P − (C − tIO). (2)
The higher the recipient’s valuation of the project and the more funding the IO provides, the better off the
recipient is.
3.4 Bargaining Weights
Bargaining power need not be equally distributed between the IO and the recipient. A simple way to allow
for asymmetric power is to introduce bargaining weights. Specifically, θ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the bargaining
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power of the recipient R, while 1− θ captures the bargaining power of the IO.
We suppose that the recipient country’s bargaining power is, among other things, increasing in a coun-
try’s economic importance, s. Formally, the recipient’s bargaining power θ is an increasing function of its
economic importance. Mathematically, we write θ = θ(., s), where (., s) is shorthand for all unmodeled
variables and economic importance s.
The effect of economic importance s is assumed to depend on IO type. We assume economic im-
portance s is more central to bargaining with non-egalitarian than with egalitarian IOs. In non-egalitarian
IOs, negotiations are heavily influenced by power politics at the expense of other considerations, such as
equity (Steinberg, 2002; Stone, 2011). Conversely, egalitarian IOs hold a bias in favor of the least devel-
oped countries. Thus, being an economically powerful country is more important when bargaining with a















We now solve the game and derive empirically testable hypotheses. The formal details can be found in the
supplementary appendix.
4.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
In a Nash (1950) bargaining model, the IO and the recipient simultaneously propose funding shares tIO and
tR. If the suggested financial commitments cover the project costs C, so that tIO + tR = C, the project is
implemented. If the funding shares fall short, tIO + tR < C, bargaining fails and the players receive zero
payoffs. Thus, bargaining succeeds whenever UIO, UR ≥ 0.2
To find the distribution of equilibrium funding shares t∗IO and t
∗
R, we maximize the Nash product with
2In Nash bargaining, the possibility that tIO+ tR > C is ignored because any additional investment is unnecessary. In practice,
it could be that C is the optimal investment level for the project under consideration. Any extra investment would be inefficient.
Although the project would be implemented on a larger scale, the two countries would have a mutual interest in scaling down the
investment so that the remaining funds could be used elsewhere.
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1−θ · (UR)θ subject to tIO + tR = C, (4)
where UIO and UR are given by equations (1) and (2), respectively. Solving this maximization problem
yields the equilibrium funding shares
t∗IO = θVIO − (1− θ)VR + (1− θ)C (5a)
t∗R = (1− θ)VR − θVIO + θC. (5b)
Equilibrium payoffs are given by
U∗IO = (1− θ)(VIO + VR − C) (6a)
U∗R = θ(VIO + VR − C). (6b)
In equilibrium, the IO’s and the recipient’s payoffs are increasing in their own bargaining power as well as
project valuations VIO and VR. However, the payoffs decrease as project costs increase.
4.2 Hypotheses
The first hypothesis concerns the different treatment of the recipient country depending on the IO’s type.
The IO’s funding share, t∗IO, increases as the recipient’s country economic importance s increases. More
powerful recipients are in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the IO. However, the importance of economic
strength depends on IO type. Given successful project implementation, the effect of economic strength s on






(VIO + VR − C) > 0. (7)
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Hypothesis 1. The IO’s funding share is an increasing function of the recipient’s economic strength. Ceteris
paribus, this effect is stronger for non-egalitarian than for egalitarian IOs.
The second hypothesis concerns the availability of side benefits from private capital, P . If the imple-
mentation of the project leverages private capital, the recipient’s valuation of the project increases relative
to a situation wherein the private capital is not available. Thus, if the project can leverage private capital,
the IO need not contribute as much to induce the recipient to participate, because the IO understands that its
contribution is crucial for leveraging private capital.3 All else constant, we expect additional private capital
P to decrease the IO’s funding share, t∗IO:
∂t∗IO
∂P
= −(1− θ) < 0. (9)
Thus,
Hypothesis 2. The IO’s funding share is a decreasing function of the project’s ability to leverage private
capital. However, this effect does not depend on the IO’s type.
As private capital becomes available, the recipient’s expected benefits grow. The abundance of sup-
plementary private capital means that the recipient cannot credible threaten to reject the project. Whether
non-egalitarian or egalitarian, the IO need not provide as much funding to induce the recipient to cooper-
ate on project implementation. Thus, both egalitarian and non-egalitarian organizations can reduce their
contributions, directing the newly available resources to other recipients and purposes.
3If private capital were a substitute for IO participation, then exactly the opposite would be true: availability of private capital
would enhance the recipient’s bargaining power.
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5 Research Design
To evaluate our hypotheses on IO-recipient bargaining, we created a data set of all GEF projects from 1991-
2011. While bargaining is a general phenomenon regardless of what is being distributed, this data set has the
major advantage of allowing us to directly quantify the equilibrium outcome of our model: for each project,
we know the share of total project cost funded by the GEF. Formally, our dependent variable (GEF funding
share) operationalizes t∗IO in the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.
Since 1991, the GEF has funded 2,795 projects, 538 of which have a regional or global focus. Since we
are interested in IO-state bargaining, we exclude these regional and global projects, leaving us with a data
set of 2,257 projects.4
The GEF is ideal for our purposes because it finances projects in a wide variety of countries, and because
GEF bargaining has been politically controversial for recipients (Streck, 2001). We have substantial varia-
tion in recipient bargaining power, as our data set of GEF projects comprises 157 recipient countries. A list
of leading recipients is shown in Table 1. The twenty leading recipients secured only 30 percent of projects,
meaning that the distribution of GEF projects is relatively even across recipients despite stark differences in
size.
[Table 1 about here.]
5.1 Dependent Variable
For each project, we divide GEF project funding by total project cost. We exclude failed and canceled
projects from the analysis to ensure that the officially allocated funds are really being disbursed.5 Normal-
izing by project size ensures that our dependent variable corresponds directly to the variable tIO in our
theoretical model. The resulting “GEF funding share” ranges from 0.7 to 100, i.e., from 0.7 percent to 100
percent of total project cost.
While the funding share is ideal for measuring the theoretical concept of interest, it is also true that ratio
4We also exclude “small grants” because the GEF administers them separately and the stakes are too low to test our two
hypotheses.
5However, the results hold even if these projects are included. For recent projects, the disbursements may have yet to occur.
Therefore, we also replicate our analysis excluding all projects that began after 2006. Overall, the GEF achieves exceptionally high
rates of project completion: fewer than 5 percent of projects fail.
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variables may cause problems for the econometric estimation. In the supplementary appendix, we therefore
estimate models that have the IO’s logarithmized contribution as the dependent variable, while total project
cost is included only as a control variable. The results are identical to those from our main specifications.
Sometimes recipients secure funding from third parties to cover their share of project costs. This need
not present difficulties for our analysis. Our theory and empirics can account for private capital, as discussed
below. Moreover, if a recipient secures a loan from an international organization, it must pay back the loan.6
This means that the recipient is ultimately paying the cost, so our model’s premises continue to hold. The
only problematic form of third-party co-financing is that by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Our
model cannot account for such financing. However, in the appendix we examined a random sample of 50
projects to verify that few involve any funding by NGOs.
We report results from both ordinary least squares and beta regression models. The latter are a general-
ization of the logit model for dependent variables that fall on the [0, 1] interval (Paolino, 2001; Ferrari and
Cribari-Neto, 2004; Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006). They are useful because the data contains boundary
values 0 and 1, which could introduce bias in a standard regression. The beta regressions can handle these
boundary values. The appendix reports even more models, such as tobit and ordered probit regressions.
5.2 Independent Variable: International Organization
The GEF delegates project design and implementation to an implementing agency such as the WB or the
UN Development Programme (UNDP). The GEF itself is simply a “capital provider” that does not directly
participate in project implementation. Andler (2007, 15) notes that “for the time being, the [GEF] secretariat
has not been able to generate any direct influence on the implementation of projects on the ground.” This
warrants our focus on implementing agencies, rather than the GEF itself.
It would be misleading to apply our distinction between non-egalitarian and egalitarian implementing
agencies if GEF agencies were selected after financial questions had been settled, but this is not the case.
Project proposals are developed by recipients in consultation with an implementing agency. This initial
proposal specifies expected GEF contributions as well as expected levels of co-financing. While the GEF
secretariat and council provide feedback regarding proposals, both initial requests and ultimate project ap-
6In contrast, all GEF grants are concessional.
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proval occur at the agency level.7
Accordingly, we split our sample by the type of the implementing agency for each GEF project. By
doing so, we can implement a stringent hypothesis test. Our theory does not predict mean differences
between egalitarian and non-egalitarian organizations; instead, it predicts that IO type modifies the effects
of bargaining power within each sample. Even if some types of projects are implemented by non-egalitarian
organizations while other types of projects are implemented by egalitarian organizations, our formal model
produces valid comparative statics within each sample. Nonetheless, we implement several tests to account
for more complex selection patterns. As documented in the appendix, these tests give us confidence that our
results are not biased by forms of agency selection.
We are left with two samples: 545 projects managed through the WB and 1,712 projects managed
through the more egalitarian agencies. Originally, the latter included only the UNDP and the UN Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP). As a result of subsequent restructuring, GEF agencies were expanded to include
additional UN agencies, such as the Industrial Development Organization, and several regional development
banks (RDBs) like the Asian Development Bank. Despite this proliferation in implementing agencies, only
3.8 percent of projects in our data set were implemented through RDBs. The WB accounts for 24.2 percent
of all projects and UN agencies implement the remaining 72.0 percent.8
In regard to this distinction, two issues warrant a discussion. First, recipients can, to some extent, self-
select into collaboration with the WB and UN agencies. Our selection tests, as detailed below, suggest
that this does not cause bias in the estimates. Theoretically, there are also good reasons to believe that
recipients expecting a bad deal from the WB may be unable to implement a particular project with the
UN agencies. UN agencies have resource constraints, and some projects may fall outside their domain of
expertise. Therefore, countries with little bargaining power sometimes have to collaborate with the WB. This
explains why we sometimes see structurally weak recipient countries collaborating with the WB, in spite of
the potentially superior deal from an egalitarian implementing agency. Since the possibility of selection bias
remains, we present below some tests designed to test for it and alleviate concerns about its effects on the
estimations.
7The supplementary appendix provides a more detailed account of the GEF project cycle.
8The supplementary appendix provides robustness checks of our analyses when we distinguish between UN agencies and RDBs.
Our results hold.
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Second, there are differences between the WB and other agencies other than the distinction between
egalitarian and non-egalitarian bargaining. Most importantly, the WB is a larger organization than UN
agencies. This difference does not seem to explain our findings, though, as the WB’s size should increase
its ability to contribute to small countries in need of funds. Another difference between the WB and the
UN agencies is that the WB focuses on a wider range of projects and often operates on a larger scale. The
control variables included in the models allow us to guard against possible bias from this.
5.3 Independent Variable: Bargaining Power
According to the theoretical model, non-egalitarian IOs should do better in bargaining with economically
weak recipients. To capture recipients’ bargaining power, or s in our bargaining model, we use their loga-
rithmized gross domestic product (GDP), measured in constant 2000 dollars.9
Although the logarithm of GDP is a simple measure, it is useful for understanding recipients’ bargaining
power. With respect to non-egalitarian international financial institutions in particular, recipients with larger
domestic economies are likely to present greater long-term payoffs. Whether the environmental content
of a GEF project is primary or whether it is “additional” to economic development, recipients with larger
economies should be in a better bargaining position.
The existing literature on international environmental politics supports our claim that economic strength
confers leverage. Barkin and Shambaugh (1999) note that nearly all environmental goods exhibit char-
acteristics of common pool resources. For example, production of ozone depleting substances is rival if
maintenance of stratospheric ozone requires limiting aggregate production. Thus, free riders do not simply
receive benefits without incurring costs, they can also reduce overall benefits through overproduction or
overconsumption. Because of this, “free riders should be able to gain concessions in international environ-
mental negotiations that approach the costs that they can impose by overconsuming the [resource]” (Barkin
and Shambaugh, 1999, 16). In other words, one of the major sources of power in international environmen-
tal bargaining is the “power to destroy” (Downie, 1999). A country’s economic power influences its ability
to threaten a wide range of environmental resources.10
9We logarithmize these values before entering them into our models, due to variance in GDP among recipient countries.
10The supplementary appendix presents analyses using other measures of power, to shed further light on determinants of bar-
gaining leverage.
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The international regime to prevent ozone depletion demonstrates this dynamic well. Originally, the
Montreal Protocol was seen as an effective instrument because it enjoyed participation by countries repre-
senting nearly all existing production of ozone-depleting substances. However, the Protocol was not imme-
diately ratified by a number of developing countries. In the years following the adoption of the Montreal
Protocol, reductions in chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) production in developed countries threatened to be offset
by increases in developing countries. As Downie (1999) notes, CFC production in India quadrupled between
1986 and 1993. Industrializing countries thus enjoyed a power to destroy in two senses. They possessed the
industrial capacity to deplete stratospheric ozone, despite reductions elsewhere. Because of this, they also
enjoyed the power to destroy international cooperation on ozone depletion. As a consequence, proponents
of the ozone regime bargained with industrializing countries, leading to the creation of new rules that were
beneficial to the latter (e.g., the creation of a multilateral fund to facilitate financial transfers).
5.4 Independent Variable: Private Capital
According to Hypothesis 2, the availability of private capital, captured by P in our formal model, should de-
crease the IO’s funding share. Unfortunately, no direct measure of this variable is available for all recipients,
over all years. While some GEF project documents summarize private co-financing, many do not.
The literature on environmental finance suggests that the availability of private capital varies signifi-
cantly across different issue areas. Specifically, private capital is most readily available for climate projects,
since many such projects offer investment opportunities. In comparison, investment opportunities in re-
source preservation are much scarcer (Clémençon, 2006).
As Dixon, Scheer, and Williams (2011) point out, many developing countries are net energy importers.
To the extent that many climate projects involve clean energy and energy efficiency, they serve both envi-
ronmental and development interests. In practice, GEF projects for energy efficiency have been remarkably
successful in leveraging private capital: Dixon, Scheer, and Williams (2011) find that GEF grants totaling
US$2.7 billion have succeeded in leveraging US$ 17.1 billion in co-financing. An example of this is the
Hungary Energy Efficiency Co-Financing Program (GEF project #111), which provided credit guarantees
to help Hungary obtain private sector financing for investment in energy efficiency. According to GEF esti-
mates, a US$ 5 million GEF commitment helped leverage US$ 20 million in co-financing over the duration
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of the project (GEF, 1996). By coding a random sample of 50 projects, we verified that private capital is
indeed heavily concentrated in the climate focal area; we show this in the see supplementary appendix.
Accordingly, we created a dichotomous variable equal to one if the focal area of a GEF project is
climate change, or zero if the focal area is elsewhere. Our correlation matrices below show that climate
projects are not highly correlated with recipients’ logarithmized GDP, suggesting that climate projects are
not endogenous to our bargaining power measure. Again, we acknowledge that climate projects differ from
other projects along multiple dimensions, not limited to private capital. To guard against possible bias from
here, we control for other project characteristics, such as size, and the time of project implementation –
climate projects have become increasingly prominent over.
5.5 Control Variables
Following best practice in observational studies, we present a wide variety of models with different sets
of control variables. Some models include none, while others include a large group of theoretically in-
formed controls. In the appendix, we present an extensive robustness analysis, paying particular attention to
selection issues and alternate political-economic hypotheses.
First, as Figure 1 shows, there has been substantial variation in GEF funding over time. This is the case
both for projects implemented by the WB and for those implemented by other agencies. Accordingly, we
include year fixed effects into our empirical model specifications.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Total project cost is another important control. Large projects generally acquire less GEF funding due to
resource constraints. To see this, note that the average GEF funding share for projects with total costs from
the 75 percentile is only about 21.3 percent, while the mean funding share for all GEF projects below this
threshold is significantly larger and amounts to 68.0 percent. Therefore, we control for total project costs in
all specifications.
Development assistance may be most effective in countries with good governance. If this is the case,
the quality of recipient country governance should influence aid allocation, which could influence project
funding shares. We address this by controlling for corruption, using the International Country Risk Guide’s
measure of political corruption.
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We also control for recipients’ political institutions. According to previous research, democratic coun-
tries have stronger incentives to provide environmental goods for their citizens (Neumayer, 2002; Li and
Reuveny, 2006). Similarly, democratic governments are subject to electoral competition that might be lever-
aged to secure additional concessions from the IO (Putnam, 1988). Thus, we add the Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland (2010) democracy measure to some models.
Finally, we include a number of region dummies.11 Since the GEF organizes its operations by region,
there is a possibility that differences in regional governance cause an omitted variable bias in the regres-
sions.12 The regional dummies are based on WB regional classifications, with two modifications. We divide
the WB’s “Europe and Central Asia” category into “Western-Northern Europe” and “Eastern Europe and
Central Asia”; we also create a “North American” region.
In the appendix, we provide summary statistics and correlation matrices for the key independent vari-
ables and controls, by implementing agency type. Notably, the distributions of the control variables are
similar across the two samples. This implies that the covariate imbalance across the subsamples is not prob-
lematic. Most importantly, the distributions of climate projects and GDP are similar across implementing
agency type, suggesting absence of selection bias.13 As to the correlations, there is a much stronger negative
correlation between country GDP and the GEF’s funding share in non-WB than in WB projects. This is
consistent with the model, as egalitarian organizations should be more favorable to a poor recipient than
their non-egalitarian counterparts.
5.6 Matching Analysis
The appendix also presents matching analyses. As a statistical technique, matching ensures that the “treat-
ment” and “control” groups are sufficiently similar to capture the effect of a variable of interest. We are
interested in the effects of GDP and the climate focal area, but these variables are not randomly assigned.
For example, GDP is correlated with population and quality of governance. Similarly, climate projects might
be implemented mainly in countries that differ significantly from non-recipients. Unfortunately, as Morgan
11Given that GDP is one of the key explanatory variables and the time span relatively short, including recipient fixed effects
would be inappropriate.
12See http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_staff. Accessed August 14, 2013.
13In the appendix, we also present summary statistics for 61 canceled projects. We find that the distributions of our key variables
are similar across completed and canceled projects, suggesting that project cancellation occurs independently of the bargaining
process that we describe.
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and Winship (2010) show, controlling for these variables does not suffice if the effects of GDP and climate
are nonlinear or heterogeneous across subjects. Matching removes observations that do not have a match in
the other group (treatment or control), enhancing the reliability of our analysis.
We use Coarsened Exact Matching from the “monotonic imbalance bounding” class of matching meth-
ods (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2011), which ensures imbalance reduction, unlike “equal percent bias reducing”
matching techniques such as propensity score or Mahalanobis matching (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). By
applying Sturge’s rule, an algorithm often used to determine the width of discrete bins in histograms, we
“slice” our main three control variables into discrete bins. After this coarsening, we match first on the
climate treatment and then on a binary GDP treatment indicating whether the recipient’s GDP is below or
above the median. For each climate project, for instance, the matching algorithm searches for a non-climate
project that falls into the same bins with respect to the control variables. If no such counterpart is found, this
observation is pruned from the data set, leaving us with a new, matched data set. Table 2 shows matching
diagnostics for the climate and GDP treatments, indicating strong reductions in covariate imbalance.
[Table 2 about here.]
We replicate our models using these two matched data sets, to ensure that we are not conflating the
effects of climate focal area and GDP with other forms of heterogeneity among the countries in our sample.
For example, climate projects could be larger than non-climate projects and countries with a high GDP
could have lower corruption than other countries. These matching analyses testify to the robustness of our
findings.
Since recipients hold the initiative in the GEF project cycle, there is justified concern that projects self-
select to specific implementing agencies. In an interview we conducted, Ramankutty (2012) pointed out
that recipient countries propose projects to an implementing agency, and the GEF only rarely transfers these
proposals to different agencies, for reasons of institutional capacity or agency expertise. We hypothesized
that economically weak countries acquire more GEF funding per project when bargaining with egalitarian
UN agencies than with the WB. Hence, countries face incentives to target specific implementing agencies
for specific projects. To alleviate this potential problem of self-selection in our empirical analysis, we also
applied matching to IO type. By doing so, we keep in our data set only projects that are comparable across
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IO type. The matching technique ensures that the WB “treatment” and the non-WB “control” group are
similar. We then re-ran all our models, with results intact.
6 Findings
Table 3 shows the results of our analyses. The upper table shows estimates for WB projects. The lower table
shows these estimates for non-Bank projects. Models (1) to (3) report ordinary least squares as our main
models. For robustness, models (4) to (6) report the beta regression models to account for nonlinearities.
All models include year fixed effects, and models (4) and (6) include region fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by country to account for multiple observations within a country.
[Table 3 about here.]
The results support the bargaining model. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the effect of recipients’ GDP
on GEF funding share is positive and statistically significant for all WB models. It is not significant for any
of the non-WB models. This is particularly interesting given that one might expect economic wealth to de-
crease the GEF’s incentive to fund projects, because poor recipient countries face acute resource constraints.
We find that the opposite is true, suggesting that bargaining considerations overwhelm the alternative ca-
pacity hypothesis. The substantive effect is neither negligible nor overwhelming: doubling a country’s GDP
increases the WB’s funding share by approximately one percentage point. Given large GDP differences
across countries, the difference induced by GDP between the largest and smallest recipient in the data is
almost ten percentage points. This effect is clearly dominated by the direct effect of project size, but it is not
so small as to be irrelevant for developing countries with limited resources.14
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient for climate focal area is negative in the WB models. How-
ever, it is not statistically significant in two of the three WB linear regressions. The estimated substantive
effect is approximately three percentage points. This is not a particularly large effect, but it may be important
on the margin. Overall, though, the GDP effect seems more important than the climate project effect.
At the same time, the sign of the coefficient flips in the non-WB linear regressions, though the esti-
mated effect is tiny and not statistically significant. The effect is negative and significant in the nonlinear
14To save space, we do not estimate substantive effects for the nonlinear models. The purpose of these models is to scrutinize the
robustness of the finding. It is easier to read and interpret the estimated effects from the linear regressions.
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specifications, but the coefficient is small. Overall, these results go against our expectations. Why is there
a difference with regard to climate funding shares between WB and non-WB projects? One plausible ex-
planation is the WB’s organizational advantage in implementing large economic projects. Perhaps private
capital is particularly drawn to climate projects funded by the WB, because the WB has the technical com-
petencies and resources to cooperate with businesses. Of course, it is also possible that the admittedly crude
climate proxy for private capital cannot fully capture the dynamics of private sector participation in WB and
non-WB projects.
Regarding controls, total project cost has a large and consistent negative effect on funding share across
specifications. This is understandable, since the GEF has limited resources. If developing countries are to
implement major projects, they must be ready to offer their own funds. As shown in the appendix, most
other control variables have weak and inconsistent effects, if any, on GEF funding share. This is particularly
interesting in view of the rather plausible competing hypothesis that bargaining outcomes reflect domes-
tic political institutions or quality of governance. Perhaps the only exception is that corruption increases
IO contributions in non-WB projects. This may reflect the notion that egalitarian organizations have an
institutionally induced preference for supporting recipient countries with limited capacity for governance.
While this notion is outside our model, it is broadly consistent with the distinction between egalitarian and
non-egalitarian organizations. Indeed, corruption seems irrelevant for WB projects.
We also estimated the same models using one data set, with interaction effects for WB and GDP as well
as for WB and climate, accounting for IO variation. As reported in the supplementary appendix, these results
mirror our findings from the split samples. The coefficients are mostly consistent with our hypotheses, and
statistical tests show that the interaction between WB and GDP is significant while the interaction between
WB and climate is not, as expected.
7 Additional Tests
The supplementary appendix examines the influence of additional controls related to recipients’ political-
economic situation, security considerations, and recipients’ financial position. To complement our matching
approach to agency selection, the supplementary appendix also controls for overall allocation patterns and
“brown” (local issues) versus “green” (global issues) environmental projects based on original data (Hicks
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et al., 2008). Overall allocation patterns are a good and simple proxy for recipient relations with different
implementing agencies, and controlling for the green-brown difference also helps because it is a strong
predictor of the choice of implementing agency. Similar to the matching results, we find no evidence for
selection bias. As a further test, we estimated Heckman (1979) models under the assumption that canceled
projects were censored. The results were fully robust, and the correlation of error terms across the outcome
and selection equation is statistically indistinguishable from zero in five out of six models, suggesting little
concern for severe selection effects.
Finally, we treat the regional development banks as non-egalitarian instead of egalitarian. Our results
continue to hold, suggesting that the difference between WB and UN is driving the findings. Since the
number of regional development banks is small, this is not a surprise. Whether these banks are more non-
egalitarian or egalitarian is difficult to tell ex ante, given that they focus on specific regional issues and may,
therefore, not reflect the global balance of bargaining power.
Since our focus is not on the exact channels of power, GDP is an ideal proxy for our empirical test.
However, the exact determinants of bargaining power are also an intrinsically interesting question (Stone,
2008). In the supplementary appendix, we estimated “power models” that contain multiple determinants:
GDP, membership on the WB’s Executive Board (WBEB), UN voting affinity with the U.S., and membership
in the UN Security Council. Overall, we found that recipients’ bargaining power depends on multiple
factors. In addition to GDP, WBEB membership is particularly influential.
We also examined changes over time. If we restrict our attention to the years 2005-2011, we found that
the differences between WB and non-WB samples diminish somewhat. Now GDP also has a negative coef-
ficient for non-WB projects. However, the coefficient for the WB sample remains twice as large. Therefore,
the difference between egalitarian and non-egalitarian organizations remains intact.
As noted above, we also estimated linear regressions that focus on the IO’s total contribution instead
of the share. This is important because the interpretation of ratio variables like funding share is unclear,
given that they have two fundamental components (Firebaugh and Gibbs, 1985). The appendix also reports
ordinary least squares with the boundary values of the dependent variable (0 and 100) excluded, models
with only the middle 80% of the funding share density, tobit estimations, and ordered probit models. The
results are robust to all these changes in specification.
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8 Conclusion
International relations are conflictual, and IO-state relations are no exception. Scholars have often ap-
proached these negotiations from a bargaining perspective (Hicks et al., 2008; Kilby, 2009; Nielson and
Tierney, 2003; Stone, 2002). We have tested hypotheses from a stylized model of IO-state bargaining, cap-
turing key ideas from previous research and offering an original contribution concerning the effect of differ-
ent IO characteristics. We tested the model, using a new data set on the GEF’s funding share of projects in
157 recipient countries from 1991-2011. Our findings provide robust support for the bargaining approach.
Economically important countries perform better in bargaining with non-egalitarian, but not egalitarian, IOs.
The substantive effect is not overwhelming, but it is important enough to play a role in negotiations attended
by poor recipient countries.
The availability of private capital reduces the GEF’s funding share, but the effect seems to only hold for
the non-egalitarian IO, the WB. This is a surprising finding to us, and we have proposed that it may reflect
the WB’s ability to mobilize resources and expertise to implement certain types of projects. In any case,
the substantive effect of the climate type indicator is smaller than that of the GDP variable. In this regard,
bargaining considerations seem to dominate over the indirect effect of additional private capital. This, of
course, may also reflect our reliance on an indirect proxy.
Our findings uncovered new puzzles worthy of exploration in future theoretical and empirical research.
First, why does the availability of private capital have different effects across the two types of IOs? This
offers interesting opportunities for future analysis, as the difference may reflect institutional factors that play
a role in international politics. Second, why do many intuitively important factors, such as corruption and
democratic governance, have little effect on bargaining outcomes? Finally, why have the funding shares
of both the WB and non-WB agencies decreased over time, as Figure 1 showed, with the decrease being
particularly dramatic for non-WB agencies? This is something that is not easy to explain with reference to
bargaining over specific projects, and a broader theory may well be needed to explain the pattern. These
theoretical and empirical puzzles warrant additional research on GEF project funding, and our analytical
framework and data set lay an excellent foundation for this line of inquiry.
More broadly, our findings contribute to two important areas of research. First, we shed light on how the
rules and practices that govern IOs’ behavior influence their interactions with states. Our simple dichotomy
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between egalitarian and non-egalitarian IOs may help scholars and practitioners explain the striking variance
across different IOs’ relations to states and other actors, such as NGOs. Second, we draw attention to the
importance of private capital in international politics. Many conventional accounts of IO-state bargaining
ignore the role of private actors (Kilby, 2009; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Stone, 2011). In the case of
the GEF, ignoring the importance of the ancillary benefits from private capital may cause researchers to
misconstrue bargaining dynamics in IO-state bargaining. For policymakers, an improved understanding of
the importance of private capital in project implementation would produce a large dividend. For example, if
future research supports our contention that private capital confers large benefits to recipients, then the trend
toward increased private sector participation could reduce distributional conflict in project implementation.
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(b) GEF funding share for non-WB projects over time.
Figure 1: Distribution of GEF funding share over time.
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# Country GEF % GEF WB %WB
Projects Projects
1 China 96 4.25 41 7.52
2 India 49 2.17 14 2.57
3 Brazil 44 1.95 16 2.94
4 Mexico 43 1.91 24 4.40
5 Russian Fed. 41 1.82 11 2.02
6 Philippines 38 1.68 15 2.75
7 Vietnam 36 1.60 14 2.57
8 Peru 33 1.46 11 2.02
9 Indonesia 32 1.42 17 3.12
10 South Africa 29 1.28 11 2.02
11 Colombia 28 1.24 11 2.02
12 Kenya 27 1.20 8 1.47
13 Argentina 25 1.11 11 2.02
14 Ecuador 24 1.06 8 1.47
15 Egypt 24 1.06 5 0.92
16 Ghana 23 1.02 9 1.65
17 Jordan 23 1.02 5 0.92
18 Morocco 23 1.02 5 0.92
19 Tanzania 23 1.02 5 0.92
20 Chile 22 0.97 5 0.92
Table 1: Top 20 recipients of GEF Projects, 1991-2011. The first column shows the number of GEF projects,
while the third column shows how many of those were funded by the WB. The second and fourth column
show the country’s share of all GEF and WB projects, respectively.
30
Climate treatment
L1 distances for WB sample
Matching Project Total Democracy Corruption Multivariate
Pre 0.244 0.018 0.112 0.473
Post 0.131 0.000 0.039 0.378
Matched 462; Unmatched 83
L1 distances for non-WB sample
Matching Project Total Democracy Corruption Multivariate
Pre 0.227 0.040 0.103 0.421
Post 0.170 0.000 0.028 0.301
Matched 1978; Unmatched 160
Binary GDP treatment
L1 distances for WB sample
Matching Project Total Democracy Corruption Multivariate
Pre 0.162 0.076 0.195 0.443
Post 0.077 0.000 0.037 0.341
Matched 428; Unmatched 117
L1 distances for non-WB sample
Matching Project Total Democracy Corruption Multivariate
Pre 0.329 0.046 0.188 0.483
Post 0.212 0.000 0.015 0.343
Matched 1897; Unmatched 241
Table 2: Matching diagnostics for climate and GDP treatments, separately for WB and non-WB samples.
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WB results
OLS models Beta regression models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model Model Model Model Model Model
GDP 2000 (log) 1.24∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.29) (0.34) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Climate Project -2.97∗ -2.65 -3.08 -0.26∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
(1.63) (1.69) (1.88) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Project Cost (log) -11.58∗∗∗ -11.27∗∗∗ -11.12∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.52) (0.54) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 512 416 416 487 401 401
R2 0.763 0.738 0.746
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Funding share (0-100 for OLS, 0-1 for beta regression).
All models are estimated with country clustered SEs.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Non-WB results
OLS models Beta regression models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model Model Model Model Model Model
GDP 2000 (log) -0.29 -0.16 -0.18 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.24) (0.34) (0.42) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Climate Project 1.11 0.73 0.69 -0.09∗∗ -0.09 -0.10∗
(0.69) (0.89) (0.91) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Project Cost (log) -12.05∗∗∗ -12.33∗∗∗ -12.33∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region Dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1582 1079 1079 1181 816 816
R2 0.839 0.831 0.832
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Funding share (0-100 for OLS, 0-1 for beta regression).
All models are estimated with country clustered SEs.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Results for WB and non-WB samples.
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